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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 24, 1976, following the Argentine military's over-
throw of the government of President Maria Estela Peron, ten
masked men carrying machine guns kidnapped 65-year-old Jos6
Siderman.' They beat and tortured him for seven days.2 After his
release, Jos6, his wife, Lea, and son, Carlos, fled from Argentina to
the United States to escape death threats.3 One year later, through
a "sham judicial intervention,"" the Argentine military seized the
Sidermans' business, principally consisting of the Hotel Gran Co-
rona, in Tucumin, Argentina.5
In 1982, 6 the Sidermans filed an action in United States fed-
eral district court. They asserted eighteen claims based on Jos6's
torture by Argentine officials and the expropriation of their Argen-
tine property.' They claimed jurisdiction under the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act (FSIA),8 Alien Torts Claims Act,' diversity of
citizenship, 10 federal question," and pendent jurisdiction."2 The
1. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 1812 (1993).
2. Id. at 703.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 704. An "intervention" is a method used by Latin American despots to deprive
persons of their property "by imposing a receivership on a person's property." First
Amended Complaint, at 14, Siderman de Blake v. The Republic of Argentina, 1984 WL
9080, (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1984), rev'd, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992) (No. 82-1772); Record at
14, Siderman de Blake (No. 85-5773) [hereinafter First Amended Complaint].
5. Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 703.
6. In 1978, in an effort to end the intervention of their business, Inmobiliaria del Nor-
Oeste, S.A. (INOSA), the Sidermans brought a successful derivative action in a Tucumdn
Court. Even though the Supreme Court of Tucumkn upheld the Tucumhn's lower court's
order to end the intervention, the order remains unenforced. There is evidence that military
officials turned the courts of Argentina into puppets. Id. at 704. The intervention enabled
the Argentine military officials and INOSA appointed receivers to extract funds from IN-
OSA's profits for themselves and purchase various of INOSA's assets at sharply discounted
prices. Id.
7. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 703 (9th Cir. 1992). The
Republic of Argentina, the Province of Tucumin, INOSA, and numerous individuals who
participated in the actions were named defendants. Id. at 704.
8. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1330 (1993) and (West Supp. 1993).
9. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (1988).
10. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(a)(2) (West Supp. 1993).
11. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (1993).
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district court dismissed the expropriation claims sua sponte, rely-
ing on the act of state doctrine, without considering subject matter
jurisdiction." The court then ordered a hearing to provide the
Sidermans with the opportunity to show damages relating to the
torture claims.14 It denied the Sidermans' motion for reconsidera-
tion of the dismissal of the expropriation claims.15 The court en-
tered a default judgment on the torture claims and awarded the
Sidermans damages totalling $2.7 million.1e On March 7, 1985, the
district court granted Argentina's motion to vacate the default
judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, recognizing that
country's immunity under the FSIA.17
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
versed and remanded, holding that: (1) a court has jurisdiction
over expropriation claims that fall within either the "commercial
activity" or "international takings" exceptions of the FSIA; (2) a
country waives immunity to claims that are directly connected
with the foreign country's invocation of American judicial author-
ity by letter rogatory; and (3) a claim asserting a foreign country's
violation of a peremptory norm can be heard only if it falls within
one of the FSIA's exceptions to sovereign immunity. Siderman de
Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1812 (1993).
This decision illustrates some of the hardships and complexi-
ties involved in bringing a suit under the FSIA. On the one hand,
the court's ruling expands jurisdiction over foreign expropriation
claims in American courts. For the first time a court has read the
FSIA's commercial activity exception broadly to allow a foreigner
to sue his own country for the expropriation of his properties
there. This represents a significant interpretative shift because
courts have historically interpreted the FSIA's grant of jurisdiction
over expropriations to include only claims brought by non-citizens
of the expropriating country. On the other hand, the court has
read the FSIA narrowly, refusing to recognize that sovereigns who
12. First Amended Complaint, supra note 4, at 6.
13. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 1992).
14. Id.
15. The Sidermans did not dispute the dismissal of the claims against the individual
defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id.
16. Id. Argentina made no court appearance. Instead, it sought the assistance of the
U.S. State Department which informed Argentina that it must appear in court to assert any
defenses, including sovereign immunity, or risk a judgment of default. Id.
17. Id. at 704.
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violate internationally recognized norms impliedly waive their im-
munity. The court flatly rejected a claim that countries violating a
peremptory norm of international law, by torturing one of their
citizens, lose their immunity."l The consequence of these two hold-
ings is absurd because they effectively make it easier for foreigners
to sue their home country for expropriation of their property than
for their torture.
II. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
A. Historical Background
Chief Justice Marshall was first, in a United States court, to
adopt the international law doctrine of sovereign immunity in The
Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon.9 Under the doctrine recognizing
a foreign state's sovereign immunity, a domestic court relinquished
jurisdiction over a foreign state. It was "a matter of grace and com-
ity on the part of the United States."2 0 The State Department se-
verely limited sovereign immunity by issuing the 1952 Tate Let-
ter.21 The Tate Letter espoused adoption of the "restrictive"
theory of sovereign immunity. 22 The restrictive theory granted im-
munity for jure imperii, sovereign or public acts, only, but did not
grant immunity for jure gestionis, private acts.2" Under the restric-
tive theory, the State Department was primarily responsible for
the initial determination of sovereign immunity.2 ' As a result of
18. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714 (9th Cir. 1992).
19. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). Chief Justice Marshall adopted the absolute theory
of sovereign immunity which has no exceptions to the grant of immunity. Id.; see also H.R.
REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606.
20. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
21. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't. of State, to Acting
Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952); see also Ver-
linden, 461 U.S. at 487-88.
22. 461 U.S. at 487.
23. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 19, at 7. "Under this principle, the immunity of a
foreign state is 'restricted' to suits involving a foreign state's public acts (jure imperii) and
does not extend to suits based on its commercial or private acts (jure gestionis)." Id. The
change in policy was a response to the increasing commercial activities conducted by foreign
governments. It reflected the belief that courts should be available to one who engages in a
commercial activity with a foreign state where that foreign government acted wrongly. Stella
Havkin, Note, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: The Relationship Between the Com-
mercial Activity Exception and the Noncommercial Tort Exception in Light of De Sanchez
v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 10 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 455, 459-60 (1987).
24. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983); Adam C. Bel-
sky et al., Implied Waiver Under the FSIA: A Proposed Exception to Immunity for Viola-
tions of Peremptory Norms of International Law, 77 CAL. L. REv. 365, 369 (1989).
[Vol. 24:3
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this allocation of responsibility, foreign nations often exerted polit-
ical pressure on the State Department to obtain immunity.2 Yet,
sometimes the foreign state directly sought immunity from the
courts.2 As these two different and distinct branches of the gov-
ernment made independent determinations of sovereign immunity,
the doctrine's status was unclear, its application was inconsistent,
and its foundation was frequently rooted in political, rather than
legal, determination.2 7
As a consequence, in 1976 Congress passed the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act" with four objectives: (1) to codify the re-
strictive theory of sovereign immunity; (2) to free the decision
from non-legal, political pressure by transferring the determination
of sovereign immunity from the executive branch to the judicial
branch; (3) to provide statutorily for service of process on a foreign
state; and (4) to furnish some means of executing a judgment
against a foreign state.29
The FSIA is the sole basis for a United States court's subject
matter jurisdiction over a foreign country. 0 It provides a general
grant of immunity to foreign states l with certain exceptions.82
United States courts have subject matter jurisdiction only over
those claims falling within one of the exceptions to immunity."
Therefore, if a plaintiff cannot assert a claim within one of the ex-
ceptions to immunity, a U.S. court has no subject matter jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate the claim against the foreign state. This means
that the foreign state will escape legal responsibility in U.S. courts
for some international law violations. Consequently, the exceptions
to sovereign immunity are crucial. Two FSIA exceptions, commer-
cial activity and expropriation,34 are particularly important to this
25. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487; Belsky, supra note 24, at 369.
26. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487. Courts based their determinations on prior State De-
partment decisions. Id.; Belsky, supra note 24, at 369.
27. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488.
28. Codified at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1602-1611 (West Supp. 1993).
29. H.R. RzP. No. 1487, supra note 19, at 7-8.
30. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989) (U.S.
courts lacked jurisdiction over Argentina in suit brought by Liberian corporation to recover
value of oil tanker destroyed by Argentine military plane, since the Alien Tort Statute did
not give the court jurisdiction over foreign sovereign).
31. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1602 and 1330(a) (West Supp. 1993).
32. Id. §§ 1604-1607, 1610 (West Supp. 1993). The exceptions reflect the idea that pri-
vate interests in litigating claims outweigh the foreign state's interest in protecting its func-
tions from judicial review. Havkin, supra note 23, at 463.
33. See Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. at 434.
34. The words "expropriation," "international takings," and "taking" are used inter-
1993]
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Case Comment.
B. The Commercial Activity Exception
The commercial activity exception is codified in
§ 1605(a)(2).35 It grants courts jurisdiction over claims involving a
foreign government's commercial activities.'" That is, jurisdiction
based upon:
a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the for-
eign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state else-
where; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States
in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United
States.37
Courts have considerable latitude in determining what is a
"commercial activity. '38 A commercial activity claim must pass a
three part inquiry: (1) the court must identify the conduct that is
relevant to the question of immunity; (2) it must characterize this
conduct as a "commercial activity"; and (3) the court must deter-
mine whether the relevant commercial activity has the statutorily
required nexus with both the cause of action and the United
States.3 9
C. The Expropriation Exception
The expropriation exception is codified in § 1605(a)(3).' It
denies sovereign immunity for claims involving expropriations that
violate international law."
Although expropriation is a "quintessentially sovereign act," 2
changeably in this Case Comment.
35. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(2) (West Supp. 1993).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 19, at 16.
39. Mark B. Feldman, The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 in
Perspective: A Founder's View, 35 Ierr'L & Coup. L.Q. 302, 306-18 (1986); Vencedora Ocean-
ica Navigacion, S.A. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation, 730 F.2d 195 (5th
Cir. 1984).
40. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(3) (West Supp. 1993).
41. Id.
42. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964); Alberti v. Empress
Nicaraguense, 703 F.2d 250, 254 (7th Cir. 1983); Carey v. National Oil Corp., 453 F. Supp.
[Vol. 24:3
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Congress grants courts limited jurisdiction over such claims in cod-
ifying the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.'8 Foreign states
do not enjoy immunity in cases
in which rights in property taken in violation of international
law are in issue and that property or any property exchanged for
such property is present in the United States in connection with
a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the for-
eign state; or that property or any property exchanged for such
property is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality
of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is en-
gaged in a commercial activity in the United States."
The exception has three requirements: (1) the case must involve
"rights in property"; (2) the property must be taken in violation of
international law; (3) and the claim must meet a "jurisdictional
nexus" with the United States. 5
1. Rights in Property
Courts have received little guidance from Congress in inter-
preting "property.""6 Some authorities have argued that since the
language of § 1605(a)(3) parallels the language of the Hick-
enlooper Exception,47 and the House's report has made a reference
1097, 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979); see also CHRISTOPH H.
SCHREUER, STATE IMMUNITY: SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 55 (1988) (citing French, Italian,
and South African cases supporting the characterization of expropriation as a public, sover-
eign act). See generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLC INTERNATIONAL LAW 322, 533
(3d ed. 1979); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 430 (2d ed. 1986); Eduardo Jim~nez
de Arechaga, State Responsiblity for the Nationalization of Foreign-Owned Property, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 546, 547-48 (Richard Falk et al. eds.,
1985).
43. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 19, at 7.
44. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(3) (West Supp. 1993).
45. Id. See generally Mohammed Bedjaoui, Some Unorthodox Reflections on the
"Right to Development," in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DEVELOPMENT. COMPARATIVE PERSPEC-
TivES 87, 105 (1987); D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 861-62 (1965).
46. H.R. RE. No. 1487, supra note 19, at 19; see also JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, SUING
FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONS 179 (1988); Melissa L. Werthan et al.,
Note, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Governments: A Comprehensive Review of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 119, 147 (1986); Robert B. Von Meh-
ren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33, 59-60
(1978); George Kahale, III & Matias A. Vega, Immunity and Jurisdiction: Toward a Uni-
form Body of Law in Actions Against Foreign States, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211, 252
(1979).
47. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370(e)(2) (1990). The Hickenlooper Exception provides a statutory
exception to the act of state doctrine "in a case in which a claim of title or other right to
property is asserted." Id.
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to that exception, Congress must have intended that courts inter-
pret "property" in § 1605(a)(3) and in the Hickenlooper Exception
similarly."" Thus, courts that use the Hickenlooper Exception as an
interpretive guide for § 1605(a)(3) construe property as applying
only to takings of tangible property, rather than contractual rights
to receive payments.4
2. Property Taken in Violation of International Law
According to U.S. courts, an expropriation violates interna-
tional law if it: (1) does not serve a public purpose; (2) is discrimi-
natory; or (3) fails to provide just compensation. For example,
when a nationalization program singles out aliens generally, aliens
of a specific nationality, or particular, individual aliens, the result-
ing expropriation violates international law.51
3. Jurisdictional Nexus
An expropriation claim can meet the statutory nexus require-
ment in either of two ways. The first way, or clause one as it is
often called,5 2 requires that the subject property or any property
exchanged for such property be present in the United States. 3
48. See Kahale, III & Vega, supra note 46, at 252. But see DELLAPENNA, supra note 46,
at 170 (arguing that courts should not interpret § 1605(a)(3) along the lines of the Hick-
enlooper Exception).
49. See De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1395 (5th Cir. 1985);
Canadian Overseas Ores Ltd. v. Compania de Acero del Pacifico, 528 F. Supp. 1337, 1346
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 727 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1984). But see West v. Multibanco Comermex,
S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 829-30 (9th Cir. 1987) (in rejecting the distinction between tangible and
intangible property as overly formalistic and contrary to the motivating policies of the Hick-
enlooper Exception, the court held that certificate of deposit, which are contracts, are the
type of property the Hickenlooper Exception sought to protect); Kalamazoo Spice Extrac-
tion Co. v. Provisional Military Gov't of Socialist Ethiopia, 616 F. Supp. 660, 663 (W.D.
Mich. 1985) ("rights in property" includes intangible assets such as majority shares of a
corporation).
50. West v. Mutibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 831-32 (9th Cir. 1987). See gen-
erally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
51. West v. Multibanco, 807 F.2d at 832. See BROWNLIE, supra note 42, at 539. "The
test of discrimination is the intention of the government: the fact that only aliens are af-
fected may be incidental, and, if the taking is based on economic and social policies, it is not
directed against particular groups simply because they own the property involved." Id. at
539 n.5. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, § 712 cmt. f. See generally SHAW, supra note 42,
at 435.
52. "Clause one" refers to the first part § 1605(a)(3) (West Supp. 1993).
53. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(3) (West Supp. 1993).
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Clause one also requires that the foreign state, or its political sub-
divisions, agencies, or instrumentalities use the property in connec-
tion with a commercial activity in the United States. 4 Yet, juris-
diction under the second clause does not require that the property,
or property exchanged for it, be in the United States.5 This is be-
cause a contrary reading of clause two, requiring the presence of
expropriated property or any property exchanged for it in the
United States, would effectively read clause one into clause two.56
Although the second clause of § 1605(a)(3) may provide courts
with a broader base of jurisdiction, the act of state doctrine may,
nevertheless, bar adjudication of such claims.5 7 That is because the
act of state doctrine mandates that courts "not 'sit in judgment' on
the acts of the government of another country,"5 h carried out in
that country.
Not all expropriation claims would be barred by the act of
state doctrine. In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,5 9 the
Court held that it would not examine the validity of a Cuban ex-
propriation. 0 As a consequence of this holding, Congress passed
54. Id; see also H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 19, at 19; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1603(b) defines
"agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" as any entity:
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and (2) which is an
organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose
shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdi-
vision thereof, and (3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States
as defined in section 1332(c) and (d) of this title, nor created under the laws of
any third country.
See § 1603 (a) and (c) for definitions of "foreign state" and the "United States"; Werthan,
supra note 46, at 150-51 (courts examine the activities of the agency in question, not those
of the foreign nation as a whole).
55. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 19, at 19. "Under the second category, the property
need not be present in connection with a commercial activity of the agency or instrumental-
ity." Id; see also Von Mehren, supra note 46, at 59; Werthan, supra note 46, at 501; Kahale,
III & Vega, supra note 46, at 255 (arguing that to meet the minimum jurisdictional contacts
necessary, where the property is not present in the United States, courts should require
more than a single, unrelated commercial transaction of the agency in this country).
56. Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Gov't of Socialist Ethiopia,
616 F. Supp. 660 (D.C. Mich. 1985), is consistent with this view. The court found jurisdic-
tion under the second clause of 1605(a)(3), even though the expropriated property was in
Ethiopia. Id. at 664.
57. DELLAPENNA, supra note 46, at 268-319; O'CONNELL, supra note 45, at 874-76. Chief
Justice Fuller first expressed the act of state doctrine in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S.
250 (1897).
58. O'CONNELL, supra note 45, at 874. The basis of the act of state doctrine lies in the
principle of sovereignty and equality of states. SHAW, supra note 42, at 120.
59. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
60. Id. at 436-39. Justice Harlan concluded that the act of state doctrine had "constitu-
tional underpinnings" arising out of separation of powers to permit the executive to prop-
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the Hickenlooper Amendment,"1 or Hickenlooper Exception, re-
versing the decision of Sabbatino.2  However, the scope of the
Hickenlooper Exception extended only to cases falling under the
first clause of § 1605(a)(3). Thus, there remained a high risk that
the act of state doctrine would continue to bar those expropriation
claims, such as the Sidermans', brought under the second clause of
§ 1605(a)(3).6 3
III. RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Customary International Law
Customary international law comprises the "general and con-
sistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation. '6 4 United States courts have enforced this kind of law.65
Courts determine what is or is not customary international law by
consulting the works of jurists writing on the subject, the general
usage and practice of nations, international conventions and trea-
ties, as well as national and international court decisions.6
Rules of international law can either be jus dispositivum or
jus cogens.67 Jus dispositivum consists of customary norms that
erly conduct foreign affairs. Id. at 416-23.
61. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370(e)(2) (1990). "[N]o court in the United States shall decline on
the ground of the Federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving
effect to the principles of international law in a case in which a claim of title or other right
to property is asserted ... based upon a confiscation or other taking. . ., by an act of that
state in violation of the principles of international law,. Id. It is sometimes called the
Sabbatino amendment.
62. D.W. GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAW 65 (1970); DFLLAPPENNA, supra note 46, at 274.
63. Mark B. Feldman, Foreign Sovereign Immunity in the United States Courts 1976-
1986, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 50, 51 (1986).
64. Committee of U.S. Citizens in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940 (D.C. Cir.
1988); RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, § 102(2); see also David F. Klein, A Theory for the
Application of the Customary International Law of Human Rights by Domestic Courts, 13
YALE J. INT'L L. 332 (1988); Karen Parker & Lyn B. Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the
Law of Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & Comp. L. REV. 411, 414-23 (1989). See generally
BROWNLIE, supra note 42, at 512-15; HEzscH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEING THE
COLLECTED PAPERS OF HEnsCH LAUTERPACHT 61 (E. Lauterpacht ed., 1970).
65. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
66. Id. at 700-01; United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 153, 160-61 (1820); Filar-
tiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880-81 (2d Cir. 1980).
67. Klein, supra note 64, at 350-53; see also THEODOR MERON. HuMAN RIGHTS AND HU-
MANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 220-22 (1989). See generally, RICHARD B. LILLICH,
INVOKING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN DOMESTIC COURTS 11-16 (1985); Parker &
Neylon, supra note 64, for an in depth study on jus cogens.
[Vol. 24:3
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depend on the respective nations' consent for enforcement.6 8 Thus,
continued and consistent objection to an emerging jus disposi-
tivum norm precludes enforcement of the norm on the objecting
state. However, the norm still binds non-objecting nations.6 9 Un-
like a jus cogens norm, a state may alter a jus dispositivum norm.
They do so by encouraging other states to violate it,70 or by abro-
gating the norm by treaty.7"
B. Jus Cogens
Jus cogens72 norms differ in that they bind all nations. Once a
norm becomes jus cogens,73 it binds all nations absolutely, regard-
less of express consent.7' In fact, the Restatement defines jus
cogens as peremptory norms precisely because no derogation from
them is permissible.7 5 The Restatement states that "[tihese rules
prevail over and invalidate international agreements and other
rules of international law in conflict with them. '76
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Con-
vention) unambiguously incorporates jus cogens by stating that:
[a] treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with
a peremptory norm of general international law. For the pur-
poses of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general
international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the in-
ternational community of States as a whole as a norm which can
68. Klein, supra note 64, at 351. See generally Parker & Neylon, supra note 64, at 417-
18.
69. Parker & Neylon, supra note 64, at 418; GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICE 10 (Hurst Hannun ed., 2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE] (a na-
tion does not have to be in full conformity, all of the time, with a jus dispositivum rule to
be bound to it).
70. Klein, supra note 64, at 351.
71. Id.
72. "Jus cogens" and "peremptory norms" are used interchangeably in this note.
73. In order for a norm of customary international law "to become a peremptory norm,
there must be a further recognition by the international community . . . as a whole that
this is a norm from which no derogation is permitted." Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in
Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (emphasis in original) (quoting the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331) [here-
inafter Vienna Convention].
74. For example, in Nicaragua v. United States of America, even though the United
States claimed justifications for the use of force, the court held that the United States vio-
lated jus cogens; 1986 I.C.J. 14, 98; see also MENNO T. KAMMINGA, INTER-STATE AccOuNTA-
RiLITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 157-59 (1992).
75. RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, § 102, cmt. k.
76. Id.
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be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international
law having the same character.7 7
Article 64 of the Vienna Convention further provides that "if a
new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any
existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void
and terminates." 78
Peremptory norms are different in that they serve the devel-
oping interests of the international community "as a whole", 79 not
just particular ideological or political goals of the stronger na-
tions.8 0 However, the combination of this broad focus with the re-
quirement that a jus cogens norm be recognized by the interna-
tional community as a whole also limits their scope and quantity.
Due to the evolving nature of peremptory norms, the drafters
of the Vienna Convention refrained from enumerating a list of pe-
remptory norms.8 ' In spite of this reluctance, there has been wide
agreement on past and current peremptory norms. A nation's prac-
tice, encouragement, or condonation of acts of genocide, slavery,
murder or disappearance, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention,
systematic racial discrimination, or consistent pattern of gross vio-
lations of international human rights have been recognized as pe-
remptory norm violations.8 2
C. Jus Cogens Against Torture
Of the recognized peremptory norms, the norm against torture
is particularly relevant to this note. Torture is widely regarded as a
violation of a peremptory norm of international law.83 All major
human rights agreements,s as well as the Torture Convention,8 5
77. Vienna Convention, supra note 73, art. 53; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 50,
§ 102 reporter's note 6 (comment k to this section adopts for the Restatement the definition
of jus cogens of Article 53 of the Vienna Convention).
78. Vienna Convention, supra note 73, art. 64. Just as treaties pertaining to an illegal
object are non-binding, treaties lose their enforceable power when, through developments of
international law, they become inconsistent with peremptory norms. Peremptory norms can
also lose their characteristic as jus cogens. Parker & Neylon, supra note 64, at 427 n.91.
79. See note 73.
80. SHAW, supra note 42, at 95; see also Parker & Neylon, supra note 64, at 428.
81. Parker & Neylon, supra note 64, at 428.
82. RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, § 702, cmt. n.
83. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Committee of U.S. Citizens in
Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp.
1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987); RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, § 712.
84. Parker & Neylon, supra note 64, at 437 cites the Universal Declaration of Human
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prohibit torture. The United Nations' Rapporteur on Torture86 rel-
ports that:
[t]orture is now absolutely and without any reservation prohib-
ited under international law whether in time of peace or of war.
In all human rights instruments the prohibition of torture be-
longs to the group of rights from which no derogation can be
made. The International Court of Justice has qualified the obli-
gation to respect the basic human rights, to which the right not
to be tortured belongs beyond any doubt, as obligations erga
omnes, obligations which a State has vis-d-vis the community of
States as a whole and in the implementation of which every
State has a legal interest .... In view of these qualifications the
prohibition of torture can be considered to belong to the rules of
jus cogens. If ever a phenomenon was outlawed unreservedly
and unequivocally it is torture.8 7
United States courts have equally recognized torture as a vio-
lation of a peremptory norm. In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,ss Judge
Kaufman explained that "there are few, if any, issues in interna-
tional law today on which opinion seems so united as the limita-
tions on a state's power to torture persons held in its custody.""5
Rights, G.A. Res. 217(III)A, art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 7, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1976); European Convention
For the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 3,
Europ. T.S. No. 5; The African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, O.A.U.
Doc CAB/LEG67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58, art. 5 (1982); Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners, at 67, U.N. Doc. AICONF. 6, 67 (1956); Declaration of the Rights
of the Child, G.A. Res. 169, 34 U.N. GAOR 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, art. 5, at 185, U.N. Doc
A/34/46 (1980); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, opened for signature March 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1967); and Principles of
Medical Ethics, G.A. Res. 3/194, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. no. 51, principle 2, at 510,
U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1983).
85. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, G.A. Res. 46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess.
Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1985), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984).
86. The United Nations appointed the Special Rapporteur "to promote the full imple-
mentation of the prohibition under international and national law of the practice of torture
and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment." ToruRs AND OTHER
CRUmL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMEr, at 5 U.N. Doc. No. 15 E/CN.4/
1986 (1986).
87. Id. at 1 (emphasis in original). "Torture may be the plague of the second half of the
twentieth century ...." Id.
88. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (when alleged torturer is found and served with process
by an alien in the United States, the Alien Tort Statute provides federal jurisdiction). See
generally Daniel S. Dokos, Note, Enforcement of International Human Rights in the Fed-
eral Courts after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 67 VA. L. RaV. 1379 (1981).
89. 630 F.2d at 881. Judge Kaufman continued, "[a]mong the rights universally pro-
claimed by all nations, . . . is the right to be free of physical torture." Id. at 890.
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Judge Kaufman explained, this "prohibition is clear and unambig-
uous, and admits of no distinction between treatment of aliens and
citizens." 90 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit gave the most extended discussion of jus cogens prior to
Siderman de Blake. In Committee of U.S. Citizens in Nicaragua
v. Reagan,9' the court stated that jus cogens comprised the "fun-
damental human rights law that prohibits genocide, slavery, mur-
der, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, and racial discrimina-
tion." 92 In a case arising from similar violations by the same
Argentine military government responsible for Siderman's torture,
Forti v. Suarez-Mason," the court held that "official torture con-
stitute[d] a cognizable violation of the law of nations."9 This law
was "universal, obligatory, and definable.
95
IV. SIDERMAN DE BLAKE V. REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA
A. Facts and Procedural History
On the evening of the 1976 military coup in Argentina,9 ten
men carrying machine-guns kidnapped Jos6 Siderman.9 7 They beat
and tortured9" Siderman for seven days. 9 His captors and tortur-
ers then dumped him'00 in an isolated area and threatened to kill
him, his wife, Lea, and son, Carlos.110' In an effort to raise cash
90. Id. at 884.
91. 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
92. Id. at 941.
93. 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987), motion for reconsideration granted in part, 694
F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988). See also generally Christopher M. Leh, Comment, Remedy-
ing Foreign Repression Through U.S. Courts: Forti v. Suarez and the Recognition of Tor-
ture,. Summary Execution, Prolonged Arbitrary Detention and Causing Disappearance as
Cognizable Claims Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 405
(1988).
94. 672 F. S'upp. at 1541.
95. Id.
96. See Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. at 1536 (describing events prior to and
after the coup).
97. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 703 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1812 (1993).
98. Id. at 703. The torture of Siderman included the use of an electric cattle prod giving
him electric shocks until he fainted. As they tortured, the Argentine military men shouted
anti-Semitic epithets, calling him a "jew bastard" and a "shitty jew." Id. See generally
Emilio F. Mignone et al., Dictatorship on Trial: Prosecution of Human Rights Violations in
Argentina, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 118 (1984) (describing the human rights violations of the
military regime and attempts at justice under the government of President Alfonsin).
99. 965 F.2d at 703.
100. Siderman suffered from serious bruising and broken ribs. Id.
101. Id.
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before fleeing to the United States to join Susana Siderman de
Blake, his daughter and a U.S. citizen since 1967, Jos6 sold his in-
terest in 127,000 acres of land for roughly ten percent of its market
value. 10 2 The Sidermans also granted management powers over
their business, Inmobiliaria del Nor-Oeste, S.A. (INOSA), 0 s to a
certified public accountant in Argentina.1 0 4 In April 1977, through
a "sham judicial intervention," 100 the Argentine military seized IN-
OSA purportedly because it lacked a representative in Argentina 1"
and because it obtained excessive funds from a Tucumfin bank.107
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that these were merely
pretexts for persecuting the Sidermans because of their religion
and economic success. 108
In 1982, the Sidermans filed an action in federal district court
against Argentina seeking relief for claims based on the expropria-
tion of INOSA and Jos6's torture."0 9 The district court dismissed
the expropriation claims on the basis of the act of state doctrine,
without considering subject matter jurisdiction.110 The court
102. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 703 (9th Cir. 1992).
Siderman received $210,000 for land with a market value of over $12 million. First Amended
Complaint, supra note 4, at 12. When the Sidermans were in the United States, the Argen-
tine military renewed their persecution of Jos6. They altered the real property records of
Tucuman to show that Jos6 Siderman once owned 127 acres of land, not the 127,000 acres
he sold. Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 703, 722. The military officials subsequently insti-
tuted an action against him in Argentina for selling land that did not belong to him. Id.
Argentina requested the assistance of the Los Angeles Superior Court in serving Jos6 with
documents relating to that action. Id. The court complied with the request, unaware of the
fraudulent situation. Id. The Ninth Circuit held, in Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Ar-
gentina, that invoking the U.S. judicial system, via letter rogatory, in an effort to further
torture and persecute Siderman, constituted a waiver of immunity from the torture claims.
Id.
103. An Argentine corporation owned by Susana Siderman de Blake (33%), Lea
Siderman (33%), Carlos Siderman (33%) and Josd Siderman (1%). Siderman de Blake, 965
F.2d at 703. Its assets included vast real estate holdings and the Hotel Gran Corona. Id. At
the time of the intervention, the holdings of INOSA had an approximate value of $25 mil-
lion. First Amended Complaint, supra note 4, at 8.
104. Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 703.
105. Id. at 704.
106. Argentine officials killed the certified public accountant to whom the Sidermans
granted management powers over INOSA before the Sidermans left Argentina. Id.
107. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 1992).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in not considering subject
matter jurisdiction first. The court said "at the threshold of every action in a district court
against a foreign state, . . . the court must satisfy itself that one of the FSIA exceptions
applies." Id. at 706 (quoting Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480
(1983)). This is an issue that the court must address even if the foreign country fails to
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awarded the Sidermans a default judgment of $2.7 million for
Jos6's torture. 1 ' It dismissed this judgment after Argentina
claimed immunity under the FSIA." 2
B. The Ninth Circuit's Opinion on the Expropriation
Claims
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the
expropriation and torture claims separately because the district
court dismissed them at different stages of the suit. 13 Within the
expropriation claims for the illegal intervention of INOSA, the
Sidermans asserted claims for Argentina's continuing management
of INOSA." ' In holding that these claims fell under the commer-
cial activity exception" 5 to the FSIA, the Ninth Circuit applied the
three clauses of the commercial activity exception.'" First, Argen-
tina's continuing management of the Hotel Gran Corona, its adver-
tising of the hotel in the United States, and receipt of payment
through major American credit cards were commercial activities
"carried on in the United States""' 7 having "substantial contact"" ' s
with it."' Furthermore, Argentina's receipt of profits from the ho-
tel formed the required "nexus"12 0 between the commercial activi-
ties and the Sidermans' grievances.' 2 ' This brought their expropri-
ation claim within the first clause of the commercial activity
exception.
Second, Argentina's solicitation of American guests for the ho-
tel and booking reservations in the United States directly related
appear in court. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 494 n.20. Note that the act of state doctrine bars a
suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be given (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)),
while sovereign immunity bars a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1)). 965 F.2d at 707.
111. 965 F.2d at 704.
112. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 669, 704 (9th Cir. 1992).
113. Id. at 706.
114. Id. at 708.
115. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(2) (West Supp. 1993).
116. 965 F.2d at 708-10.
117. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(2) (West Supp. 1993).
118. Id. § 1603(e); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 669 708-09
(9th Cir. 1992).
119. 965 F.2d at 708-09.
120. Id. at 709 (citing America West Airlines, Inc. v. G.P.A. Group, Ltd., 877 F.2d 793,
796 (9th Cir. 1989)).
121. Id. at 709. The court also noted that a sham judicial intervention "may" constitute
a "commercial activity," if the Sidermans proved on remand that this was an activity that a
private person could perform in Argentina. Id. at 709 n.10.
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to the Sidermans' causes of action for conversion, constructive
fraud, intentional interference with business relationships, and
breach of fiduciary duty.' The court stated that, these allegations
met the requirements of the second clause because they were based
"upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere." s
Finally, the court stated, if the Sidermans proved that the ar-
ticles of incorporation of INOSA entitled them, as shareholders, to
receipt of dividends at their place of residence, then their expro-
priation claims fell within the third clause of the commercial activ-
ity exception. The receipt of dividends in the United States would
have a "direct effect" on the United States. 24
The court also applied the international takings exception 125
to the expropriation claims.'26 Since it held that at this stage of the
action the court must only assertain whether the complaint prop-
erly alleged a violation of the international takings exception,'1 2 7
the court reviewed the complaint filed by the Sidermans.
The complaint alleged that Argentina expropriated INOSA
because the Sidermans were a Jewish family, " a discriminatory
motivation based on ethnicity, and did not compensate the
Sidermans for their property.'2 9 This was a violation which met the
'requirements of the international takings exception because it con-
stituted a violation of international law.'30 Furthermore, the expro-
priation claims met the jurisdictional nexus requirement of the
second clause of the expropriation exception.'' The complaint al-
leged that INOSA, as an agency, solicited American guests for the
Hotel Gran Corona and accepted major American credit cards for
payment. 32 There was no requirement, under the second clause of
the exception, that the property be in the United States.' 3
122. Id. at 709.
123. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(2) (West Supp. 1993).
124. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 669, 711 (9th Cir. 1992).
125. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(3) (West Supp. 1993).
126. Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 712.
127. Id. at 711.
128. Id. at 712.
129. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 669, 712 (9th Cir. 1992).
130. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, § 712 cmt. f; supra notes 50-51 and
accompanying text.
131. 965 F.2d at 712; see also supra text accompanying notes 52-56.
132. 965 F.2d at 712.
133. Id.; see also supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
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However, since Jos6, Lea, and Carlos were Argentine citizens
at the time of the intervention," and because "expropriation by a
sovereign state of the property of its own nationals does not impli-
cate settled principles of international law," ' the court held that
Jos6, Lea, and Carlos could not invoke this exception. 36 Therefore,
only Susana, an American citizen since 1967, l'3 could assert a claim
within the international takings exception to immunity for the ex-
propriation claims.' s
Even though the court may have jurisdiction over the expro-
priation claims, the Ninth Circuit noted that, on remand, the dis-
trict court could consider the act of state doctrine. 5 9 However, the
act of state doctrine could only be considered after the court deter-
mines whether it has subject matter jurisdiction. " '
C. The Ninth Circuit's Opinion on the Torture Claims
The court also held that, when a state violates a peremptory
norm, the cloak of immunity provided by international law does
not fall away."" While the court described torture extensively as a
134. Jos6, Lea, and Carlos were still not U.S. citizens at the time of the Ninth Circuit's
holding. See generally Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1812 (1993).
135. 965 F.2d at 711 (citing Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l. Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1105
(9th Cir. 1990)); see also De Sanchez v. Banco Central De Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1396
(5th Cir. 1985) ("As long as a nation injures only its own nationals,. . . then no other state's
interest is involved; the injury is a purely domestic affair to be resolved within the confines
of the nation itself.").
136. 965 F.2d at 711.
137. Id. at 704.
138. Because only Susana Siderman de Blake met the requirements of the expropria-
tion exception, it was crucial to Jos6, Lea, and Carlos that they successfully allege jurisdic-
tion under the commercial activities exception.
139. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 669, 713 (9th Cir. 1992).
140. Id. Note that the Ninth Circuit's opinion concerns only whether or not the court
had subject matter jurisdiction over the Sidermans' claims. That is, since the lower court
dismissed the claims on the basis of the act of state doctrine without considering subject
matter jurisdiction, no decision was ever reached on the merits.
141. Id. at 719. The court also held that the existing treaty exception did not apply. Id.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), was a non-binding au-
thoritative statement of customary international law, but not an international agreement for
purposes of the existing treaty exception, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1604. It also held that the U.N.
Charter, which does not discuss compensation or individual remedies, does not "expressly
conflict" with the FSIA. Id. at 719-20. However, the court held Argentina waived immunity.
By invoking U.S. judicial authority, by letter rogatory, in attempting to enlist the Los Ange-
les Superior Court's help in serving process on Jos6 Siderman in its lawsuit against him in
Argentina, for selling land which he allegedly did not own, Argentina waived immunity on
the torture claims. Id. at 720-22.
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violation of jus cogens, the court felt powerless, in light of Argen-
tine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,1" ' to deny Argen-
tina immunity. 1" In Amerada Hess,'4 4 the United States Supreme
Court held that the FSIA was the sole basis for obtaining jurisdic-
tion over a foreign state in the courts of this country. "5 In granting
Argentina immunity in Siderman de Blake, the Ninth Circuit
stated:
[t]he Court was so emphatic in its pronouncement 'that immu-
nity is granted in those cases involving alleged violations of in-
ternational law that do not come within one of the FSIA's ex-
ceptions,' and, so specific in its formulation and method of
approach, that we conclude that if violations of jus cogens com-
mitted outside the United States are to be exceptions to immu-
nity, Congress must make them so. 16
V. ANALYSIS
A. The Relationship Between the Commercial Activity Ex-
ception and Expropriation Claims
Prior to the adoption of the FSIA, a foreign nation sued for
expropriation was immune.147 Due to the heightened sensitivity in
cases of foreign expropriation,'4" Congress only granted very lim-
ited jurisdiction over those claims which met certain strict require-
ments.' 49 These requirements were threshold questions, preventing
plaintiffs from circumventing them through artful pleadings."o
In short, the requirements are important. By allowing the
Sidermans to shape claims that concern activities subsequent to an
expropriation, a "quintessentially sovereign act,"'' a court ex-
142. 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
143. 965 F.2d at 714-19.
144. 488 U.S. at 428.
145. Id. at 443.
146. Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 719 (citations omitted).
147. See George Kahale, III, Characterizing Nationalizations for Purposes of the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Act of State Doctrine, 6 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 398
(1983).
148. This sensitivity is rooted in the fact that countries have sovereign rights over their
resources and economic activities; "Nationalization is the supreme manifestation of sover-
eignty and of the right to development." Bedjaoui, supra note 45, at 105.
149. Feldman, supra note 63, at 50. The requirements are listed in § 1605(a)(3).
150. See generally Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1106 (9th Cir.
1990).
151. See supra note 42.
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tends, for all practical purposes, the very grant of jurisdiction
which Congress originally intended to be narrow.
A claim based on an act of expropriation does not meet the
requirements of the commercial activities exception.5 2 Congress
has defined "commercial activity" to mean a regular course of com-
mercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction. 15 8 The na-,
ture of the activity defines the transaction's commercial character.
Therefore, activities in which a private person can engage are com-
mercial.154 On the other hand, "[a]n activity is public and 'non-
commercial' if it is one which only a sovereign state can
perform."15
Expropriation is a sovereign act." The FSIA supports this
characterization because a private person is incapable of expropri-
ating a party's property.' 57 Therefore, as a sovereign act, expropri-
ation does not fall within the commercial activities exception. As a
result, the Sidermans' claim, because of its very nature as an ex-
propriation claim, was wrongly decided under the commercial ac-
tivity exception.
First, because the Sidermans' real grievance was the expropri-
ation of INOSA, Argentina's solicitation of American guests follow-
ing the expropriation did not have a sufficient nexus with the act
of expropriation. Therefore, the Sidermans' allegations that, as an
agency of Argentina, INOSA's commercial activities following the
expropriation brought their claims within the commercial activity
exception of the FSIA, 15 incorrectly concentrated on the activities
following the expropriation. This is because the guest solicitation
in the United States, after the expropriation of INOSA, did not
have a sufficent nexus with the act of expropriation.
Expropriation is a truly sovereign act. Once a country expro-
priates, it should, logically, be able to do as it sees fit with the
expropriated property. For all practical purposes, the country now
owns the property and the subsequent commercial activities in
152. Kahale, III, supra note 147, at 398.
153. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1603(d) (West Supp. 1993).
154. Joseph v. Office of the Consulate General of Nigeria, 830 F.2d 1018, 1024 (9th Cir.
1987).
155. Id. at 1024.
.156. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964); Alberti v. Em-
presa Nicaraguense, 705 F.2d 250, 254 (7th Cir. 1983); Carey v. National Oil Corp., 453 F.
Supp. 1097, 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979).
157. But see note 121.
158. First Amended Complaint, supra note 4, at 19-20.
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which the country engages do not provide the court with jurisdic-
tion. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit effectively took an expropria-
tion, focused on the commercial activities subsequent to that ex-
propriation, and treated the claim as a commercial activity,
making it fall within the commercial activity exception to strip Ar-
gentina of its Foreign Sovereign immunity. Instead of concentrat-
ing on the commercial activities following the expropriation, the
Ninth Circuit's inquiry should have focused on the act of expropri-
ation itself to protect expropriation's sovereign character.
Second, excluding the Sidermans' expropriation claim from
the commercial activity exception would have been consistent with
Congressional intent. The legislative history of the commercial ac-
tivities exception reflects Congress' intent that it not apply to
claims arising out of expropriation. 59 This is because a claim, like
the Siderman's, principally based on expropriation, does not meet
the requirements of the commercial activity exception,
§ 1605(a)(2).
The second clause of this section denies immunity "upon an
act performed in the United States in connection with a commer-
cial activity of the foreign state elsewhere."'1 0 The third clause of
that same section denies immunity "upon an act outside the terri-
tory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity
of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in
the United States."' 6 ' The two clauses differ only in the location
where the "act" must occur. Therefore, given that expropriation is
a sovereign act, and that the legislative history strongly suggests
that the court concentrate on the act at issue, the key question is
whether the "act" performed in connection with the commercial
activity must itself be of a commercial nature, or may it include
sovereign acts, such as expropriation. In other words, can a U.S.
court exercise jurisdiction over expropriation claims which are
deemed to meet the requirements of the commercial activity ex-
ception, § 1605 (a)(2), because of some perceived connection be-
tween the expropriation and the commercial activity? The House
Report's section-by-section analysis explains that the second
clause of this section denies immunity in a "case where a claim
arises out of a specific act in the United States which is commer-
cial or private in nature and which relates to a commercial activity
159. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 19, at 18-19.
160. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(2) (West Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
161. Id.
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abroad. 11 6 2 In light of the similarity between the three clauses of
the commercial activity exception, with the exception of minor dif-
ferences in where the "act" must occur, those three sections should
be interpreted similarly. This analysis, in light of the House's Re-
port, strongly suggests that the act performed "in connection with
a commercial activity" must be commercial as well.163
Thus, a claim falling under § 1605(a)(2) must, logically, be
construed as one which is (1) based on a commercial act, (2) car-
ried on in the United States or outside it, (3) causing a direct effect
in the U.S., and (4) in connection with a commercial activity. Pur-
suant to congressional intent as reflected in the language of
§ 1605(a)(2), expropriation's "quintessentially sovereign," 164 rather
than commercial, nature necessarily precludes the court from exer-
cising jurisdiction under the commercial activity exception.
The case law also supports this interpretation of the relation-
ship between the commercial activity exception and expropriation
claims, as well as expropriation's characterization as a sovereign
act not reviewable by U.S. courts. For example, in D'Angelo v. Pe-
troleos Mexicanos,165 a holder of nationalized concession contracts
sought compensation. The district court, in commenting on the
commercial activities subsequent to the expropriation stated that
"[t]he fact that the Mexican government ultimately entered the oil
business through Pemex does not make the expropriation itself a
commercial activity. It is a classic example of the exercise of gov-
ernmental power as an act of the sovereign.""6
Carey v. National Oil, Corp.167 was a later, but the first major
case concerning expropriation under the FSIA. The plaintiffs
claimed they suffered damages as a result of Libya's nationaliza-
tion of foreign owned oil concessions."6 8 This nationalization inter-
rupted a supply contract between the plaintiffs and an affiliate of a
162. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 19, at 19 (emphasis added).
163. See Kahale, III, supra note 147, at 405-07. But see Von Mehren, supra note 46, at
58 (arguing that if the expropriation involves a concessions contract, then the breach of
contract is a commercial activity within the meaning of § 1605(a)(2)).
164. See supra note 42.
165. 422 F. Supp. 1280 (D. Del. 1976), afl'd, 564 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1035 (1978).
166. Id. at 1286.
167. 453 F. Supp 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd on other grounds, 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir.
1979).
168. Id. at 1099.
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company whose interests Libya nationalized.16 9 The plaintiffs ar-
gued that the nationalization of oil concessions was an act "in con-
nection with a commercial activity" because the nationalization
was the first step in establishing an integrated oil business.
1 70
The district court rejected this argument. Stating that the
FSIA "leaves no question that non-commercial activities of a for-
eign state will be treated with the same deference to which they
were entitled before 1976,' ' 7 the court explained that "nationali-
zation is the quintessentially sovereign act, never viewed as having
a commercial character. 1 72 The court viewed all events, irrespec-
tive of their commercial nature, as events emanating from the na-
tionalization and, as such, non-reviewable, sovereign acts.
Libyan American Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya,'" another case involving nationalization, is consistent
with Carey. " The plaintiff alleged that the waiver, commercial ac-
tivity, and expropriation exceptions granted the court jurisdiction
to adjudicate a suit for the expropriation of its physical assets and
concessions interests. The plaintiff claimed the nationalization
constituted a breach of contract, and was, therefore, commercial in
nature within the meaning of § 1603(d) '  of the FSIA. 176 Although
finding that Libya waived its immunity,7 the court, nevertheless,
held the act of state doctrine applicable.1 7 8 The court characterized
169. The plaintiffs themselves did not have property nationalized by Libya. Id.
170. Kahale, III, supra note 147, at 411 (citing Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Op-
position to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 34, Carey v. Nat'l. Oil, Corp., 453 F. Supp.
1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
171. Carey, 453 F. Supp. at 1102.
172. Id.
173. 482 F. Supp. 1175 (D. D.C. 1980). See generally Paul A. Pavlis, Note, Interna-
tional Arbitration and the Inapplicability of the Act of State Doctrine, 14 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 65 (1981).
174. See supra text accompanying notes 167-72. But see American Group, Inc. v. Is-
lamic Republic of Iran, 493 F. Supp. 522, 526 (D. D.C. 1980, vacated on other grounds, 657
F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that uncompensated expropriation resulting in a State
monopoly fell within § 1605(a)(2)).
175. "A 'commercial activity' means either a regular course of commercial conduct or a
particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial character of an activity shall be
determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or
act, rather than by reference to its purpose." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1603(d) (West Supp. 1993).
176. Kahale, III, supra note 147, at 413 (citing Memorandum of Libyan American Oil
Co. in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and in Support of Petition to Confirm Arbitral
Award at 31-42, Libyan American Oil).
177. 482 F. Supp. at 1178.
178. Lybian American Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Lybian Arab Jamahiriya, 482 F.
Supp. 1175, 1179 (D.D.C. 1980).
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expropriations as "public acts of the sovereign removed from judi-
cial scrutiny,"17' and said that Libya's nationalization was a "clas-
sic example of an act of state."'18 0
Where a claimant asserts jurisdiction under the commercial
activity exception based on post-expropriation activities with the
expropriated business, the court is likely to hold that the claim is
rooted in expropriation, not commercial activity. Alberti v. Em-
presa Nicaraguense De La Carne s addressed these jurisdictional
issues surrounding the commercial activity and expropriation ex-
ceptions. Alberti owned 35% of the stock of a livestock slaughter-
ing business which was nationalized in 1979.182 The government of
Nicaragua continued operating the business through a state com-
pany. 8e After his business' expropriation, Alberti ordered beef
from the state company, but refused to pay for it.18' Instead, he
sued for conversion of his stock and sought to offset the purchase
with the uncompensated nationalization. 8 5 The court held that the
suit was not "based upon" the commercial activity. 86 "The com-
mercial transaction involved, the beef shipment, ha[d] nothing to
do with this lawsuit beyond the fact that it gave rise to the debt
plaintiffs [sought] to offset. The basis of this lawsuit was the na-
tionalization of [plaintiff's stock], which was a quintessential gov-
ernment act.""87 The fact that the state agency continued the oper-
ations of the expropriated business, leading to United States sales,
did not concern the court. It reasoned that the court must not al-
low a plaintiff to transform a dispute arising from a governmental
act, nationalization, into a commercial dispute. '88 Therefore, it
viewed the entire dispute as one arising from a sovereign act.
Furthermore, courts deny plaintiffs the opportunity to re-de-
fine the foreign state's "act" performed to fall under a section of
the FSIA favorable to the particular plaintiff. In Magnus Electron-
ics, Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada'8e for example, the plaintiff
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. 705 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1983).
182. Id. at 252.
183. Id. Alberti did not receive compensation for the nationalization of his property. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Alberti v. Empresa Nicaraguense De La Carne, 705 F.2d 250, 254 (7th Cir, 1988).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. 620 F. Supp. 387 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
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sued for the conversion of goods shipped to an Argentine buyer.19
The Argentine air force pirated the goods when they were in Ar-
gentine customs.191 The plaintiff claimed jurisdiction under the
commercial activity exception."' But the court held that a plaintiff
could not force its lawsuit based on tortious conduct, an act of
piracy, "into the mold of 'commercial activity' of a foreign
state."'19 "[F]or better or worse, governmental expropriation of
private property is the paradigmatic instance of activity coming
under the first rubric [sovereign activity] and not the second [com-
mercial activity].' ' 194 Thus, expropriation remains a sovereign act
which confers upon sovereign states' immunity from suit.
Courts also reject plaintiffs' attempts to characterize their ex-
propriation claims as noncommercial tort claims under
§ 1605(a)(5). In De Sanchez v. Banco Central De Nicaragua,99
Nicaragua stopped payment on plaintiff's certificate of deposit.
Since the plaintiff was a citizen of the expropriating country, the
court had no jurisdiction under the international takings excep-
tion.19 She, instead, brought her claim under the noncommercial
tort exception, alleging misrepresentation and conversion of prop-
erty. But the court held that Congress did not intend "plaintiffs to
be able to rephrase their taking claims in terms of conversion and
thereby bring the claims even where the takings were permitted by
international law. 19 7
Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank' 98 also rejected an at-
tempt to convert a taking claim into a noncommercial tort claim. A
plaintiff's claim for expropriation must fall under § 1605(a)(3). 99
"To hold otherwise would be to allow plaintiffs to escape the re-
quirements of § 1605(a)(3) through artful recharacterization of
their takings claims.
20 0
190. Id. at 388-89.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 389.
193. Id. at 390.
194. Magnus Electronics, Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 620 F. Supp. 387, 390 (N.D. Ill.
1985).
195. 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985). See generally Havkin, supra note 23.
196. 770 F.2d at 1394-97. The court held that uncompensated expropriation of property
belonging to nationals did not violate international law. Id.
197. Id. at 1398.
198. 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990) (the Philippine government dishonored a letter of
credit payable to the plaintiff, a Philippine national).
199. Id. at 1106.
200. Id.
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Given that the restrictive theory grants immunity for sover-
eign acts, and expropriation constitutes a sovereign act, the com-
mercial activity following the expropriation was an irrelevant basis
for § 1605(a)(2) jurisdiction.2 0 1 This is because the post-expropria-
tion commercial activities did not have a sufficient nexus to the act
of expropriation. This analysis is similarly compelling in the case
of Siderman de Blake.2 0 2 Argentina first expropriated INOSA and
then continued operating it, creating commercial activities con-
nected with the United States."'
All these cases are consistent with the view that the
Sidermans' expropriation claims must fall under § 1605(a)(3) to
grant the court jurisdiction. These cases repeatedly characterize
expropriation as a sovereign act, not contemplated by Congress in
the commercial activity exception. Post-expropriation acts of the
country or agency are irrelevant because they necessarily emanate
from a sovereign act, and are not sufficiently related to the act of
expropriation.
This interpretation of the commercial activity exception is also
the most reasonable. First, restricted jurisdiction over claims aris-
ing from expropriation comports with congressional intent." 4 Sec-
ond, providing courts with jurisdiction because of these later "com-
mercial activities" allows plaintiffs to escape the burdens of the
international takings exception. For example, Congress expressly
stated that the expropriation must violate international law.2"" In
Siderman de Blake, allowing the Sidermans to allege jurisdiction
under the commercial activities exception allows them to sue for
expropriation without a finding of a "violation of international
law."
Last, applying the commercial activity exception to claims
based on the expropriating country's post-expropriation commer-
cial activities seriously limits the sovereign's rights to expropriate
and its respective benefits. While the expropriation of INOSA may
be discriminatory, other expropriations serve economic and social
goals. Irrespective of whether the expropriation is for social or dis-
201. The court commented on the nature of the action in the context of plaintiff's claim
that the commercial activity exception to the act of state doctrine applied. Id.
202. See 965 F.2d 669, 706-13 (9th Cir. 1992).
203. Id.
204. See supra notes 40-56 and accompanying text (analyzing the requirements of
1605(a)(3)).205. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(3) (West Supp. 1993).
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criminatory reasons, American courts taking jurisdiction because of
post-expropriation commercial activities must review acts of gov-
ernments which Congress intended to be reviewable only within
the narrow confines of § 1605(a)(3).
B. The Expropriation Exception
1. Article 21 of the American Convention
The Ninth Circuit, like other courts,"' was too quick to over-
look the possibility that uncompensated expropriation from a
country's nationals might violate article 21 of the American Con-
vention on Human Rights (American Convention).2  The Ameri-
can Convention's primary objective is the protection of basic
human rights derived from human personality, irrespective of na-
tionality.2 08 Most notably, unlike the Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights or the Rome Convention, the American Convention ex-
pressly provides for a "right to property.
20 9
Nationals and non-nationals are not distinguished under arti-
cle 21. A "plain language" interpretation of the article suggests
that, unlike traditional expropriation law, the right to property ap-
plies to both nationals and non-nationals. The fact that most
human rights treaties do not provide such a right underscores the
206. De Sanchez v. Banco Central De Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1397 (5th Cir. 1985)
(uncompensated expropriation from a country's nationals does not violate international
law); see also Chuidian v. Philippine Natl Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1105 (9th Cir. 1990); Ver-
linden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 320, 325 n.16 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd on other
grounds, 461 U.S. 480 (1983); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, § 712, cmt. a.
207. Article 21 of the American Convention provides:
1. Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The law may
subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of society.
2. No one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment of just com-
pensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest, and in the cases and
according to the forms established by law.
3. Usury and any other form of exploitation of man by man shall be prohibited
by law.
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, at 7,
OEA/ser. LfV/II.23 doc. rev.2 entered into force July 18, 1978 [hereinafter American
Convention].
208. THOMAS BUERGENTHAL ET AL., PROTECTING HuMAN RiGHrs IN THE AMERICAS, SE-
LECTED PROBLEMS 55 (2d ed. 1986); Hector Gros Espiell, The Organization of American
States, in THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 555 (Philip Alston ed., 1982).
209. Espiell, supra note 208, at 573 n.45. But see Protocol No. 1 to the European Con-
vention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952, Europ. T.S. No. 9,
213 U.N.T.S. 262 (1952) (providing that "no one shall be deprived of his possessions
. . .. 11).
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international community's decreasing concern with the protection
of property. 10 However, according to U.S. courts, although the dis-
tinction between aliens and nationals is eroding for basic human
rights, like the rights not to be murdered, tortured, or otherwise
subjected to cruel and inhuman punishment, this distinction re-
mains important to expropriation claims.2"
Unlike peremptory norms, the American Convention, with its
treaty-like character, is binding only upon those states agreeing to
be bound. However, some rights in the treaty may be jus cogens
and binding on non-contracting nations. Argentina bound itself to
the treaty with its own set of reservations, ratifying the American
Convention on September 5, 1984.212
Because Argentina's act of expropriation occured before ratify-
ing the American Convention, whether the American Convention
applies to INOSA's expropriation remains an unanswered question.
Regardless of how one resolves this issue within the contours of
Siderman de Blake, Latin American countries are now party to the
American Convention. Thus, the issue is unresolved and deserves
brief discussion.
2. Analyzing the Expropriation of INOSA Within the Contours of
Article 21
The expropriation of INOSA is inconsistent with article 21.213
210. Richard B. Lillich, Civil Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw: LEGAL
AND POLICY ISSUES 157 (Theodor Meron ed., 1984); see also Espiell, supra note 208, at 559.
"Inclusion of the right to property is not wholly justified, for the view could be taken that
the question falls within the competence of the national legislature." Id.
211. De Sanchez v. Banco Central De Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1397 (5th Cir. 1985).
See also generally Lithgow v. United Kingdom, 8 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 329 (1986) (Euro-
pean Commission on Human Rights held that Protocol 1 only gave non-nationals a remedy
for uncompensated nationalizations because of generally recognized principles of interna-
tional law); R. Anthony Salgado, Note, Protection of National's Rights to Property Under
the European Convention on Human Rights: Lithgow v. United Kingdom, 27 VA. J. INT'L L.
865 (1987).
212. HANDBOOK OF EXISTING RULES PERTAINING To HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-
AMERICAN SYSTEM 65, OEA/Ser. L./V./I.65 doc. 6 (1985) [hereinafter OAS HANDBOOK]. Res-
ervations cannot be incompatible with the purpose of the treaty. See BUERGENTHAL, supra
note 208, at 52-65, 386; MERON, supra note 67, at 17-20.
213. There is an issue as to whether the American Convention protects the rights of
shareholders. The American Convention only protects the rights of individuals. American
Convention, supra note 207, art. 1. Therefore, it is unsettled whether shareholders allege
corporate rights or rights as natural persons. In one case, after the Nicaraguan Government
nationalized several industries in 1979, Carlos Martinez Riguero, a shareholder in confis-
cated Empresa Cereales de Centroam6rica, S.A., filed a petition with the Inter-American
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The second clause of the article states that "[no] one shall be de-
prived of his property except upon payment of just compensation,
for reasons of public utility or social interest, and in the cases and
according to the forms established by law.9
2 1 4
Thus, INOSA's expropriation was in conflict with article 21 in
three ways. First, Argentina did not compensate the Sidermans for
the expropriation of INOSA.215 Second, the expropriation did not
serve Argentina's "public utility or social interest."216 Last, the
Tucumdn Supreme Court's order to the military to end the inter-
vention of INOSA is testimony to the expropriation's deviation
from the forms established by Argentina's law.2
17
Yet, because Argentina took a reservation to article 21,2"1 the
Article's application is subject to limitations. That reservation de-
clares that Argentina is not subject to questions relating to its eco-
nomic policy, nor anything "the national courts may determine to
be matters of 'public utility' and 'social interest,' nor anything they
may understand to be 'fair compensation'." 1'9
The meaning of this reservation is not entirely clear. For ex-
ample, while article 21 refers to "just compensation," the reserva-
tion refers to "fair compensation." Therefore, how this reservation
would apply to the Sidermans' claim remains ambiguous.
Nevertheless, article 21's applicability to the FSIA is signifi-
cant because it suggests a jurisdictional basis for expropriation
claims arising out of situations similar to the Sidermans'. In
Siderman de Blake, while Susana was a U.S. citizen who could as-
Commission on Human Rights. Case 7788, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 89, OEA/ser. LJV/II.71, doc. 9
rev. 1 (1987). He alleged the government violated his right to property as set forth in article
21 of the American Convention. Id. at 97-98. The Commission agreed. By declaring that
Nicaragua violated the shareholder's right to property, the Commission held article 21 ap-
plicable to corporate shareholders in their individual capacities. Id. at 109-10. However, in a
later case involving Peru's announced plan to expropriate all privately held shares of Peru-
vian banks, the Commission held that there was no violation of article 21. Case 10,169,
Inter-Am. C.H.R. 423, OEA/ser. L./V./II/79 doc. 12 rev. 1 (1991). With little analysis, the
Commission held that expropriation would affect the rights of the corporations and not
those of individuals. Id. at 425. In light of these two decisions, the issue of whether, under
the American Convention, the intervention of INOSA affected its corporate rights or the
property rights of the Sidermans remains unresolved.
214. OAS HANDBOOK, supra note 212, at 36.
215. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 704, 712 (9th Cir.
1992).
216. Id. at 703-04.
217. Id. at 704.
218. OAS HANDBOOK, supra note 212, at 64-65.
219. OAS HANDBOOK, supra note 212, at 65.
1993]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
sert jurisdiction under the international takings exception, Jos6,
Lea, and Carlos, were Argentinians at the time of INOSA's expro-
priation. They could not assert jurisdiction under that section.
Thus, they relied on the commercial activities exception to assert
their claim for INOSA's expropriation. However, the taking should
have qualified as "property taken in violation of international
law," cognizable under § 1605(a)(3) because the expropriation of
INOSA violated international law by violating article 21.20 Distin-
guishing between Susana Siderman de Blake and the other mem-
bers of the Siderman family would then be irrelevant. The applica-
tion of the commercial activities exception would, therefore, be
unnecessary because the court would have jurisdiction under the
expropriation exception.
C. The International Law Principle of Jus Cogens and its
Relationship to the FSIA
The court, at least partially, misinterpreted the Sidermans'
position that a violation of jus cogens waived sovereign immunity.
According to the court, the Sidermans claimed jurisdiction under a
nonexistent section of the FSIA, one that provides an immunity
exception to a state violating jus cogens norms. But the Sidermans
understood that their claims must fall within one of Congress' enu-
merated FSIA exceptions to strip Argentina's immunity. Thus,
they argued that a nation implicitly waives immunity under
§ 1605(a)(1) when it violates a peremptory norm of international
law. 22 1
Both the courts' and the Siderman's positions are consistent
with the rule that attempts to claim jurisdiction under an excep-
tion to immunity falling outside the listed exceptions of § 1605
must fail after Amerada Hess.222 In that case, the Supreme Court
drew "the plain implication that immunity is granted in those
cases involving alleged violations of international law that do not
come within one of the FSIA's exceptions. ' '2 2 3 The Court reasoned
that the denial of immunity to foreign states in suits "in which
rights in property taken in violation of international law are in is-
220. Of course this is subject to how one interprets the validity and application of Ar-
gentina's reservation to article 21.
221. Brief for Appellant at 35-42, Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d
699 (9th Cir. 1992) (No. 82-1772), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1812 (1993).
222. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
223. Id. at 436.
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sue," showed Congress' intent to prohibit immunity only for spe-
cific international law violations within the enumerated excep-
tions.2 24 The Court held that Congress had international law in
mind when it adopted the FSIA, evidenced by the international
takings exception, and that Congress intentionally omitted other
violations of international law as grounds for denial of a nation's
immunity.2 "
This position is absurd in the context of Siderman de Blake
-a case not contemplated by Amerada Hess.2 11 It is absurd to
suggest that, while Congress denied immunity for takings of prop-
erty which violate international law, Congress intentionally con-
ferred immunity for torture-a basic human rights violation which
breaches the highest principles of international law reflected in its
status as a peremptory norm.
A more compelling explanation for Congress' express inclusion
of § 1605(a)(3) is that, although expropriation, unlike torture, is
an act fundamentally consistent with sovereignty, courts have been
granted limited jurisdiction over expropriation claims. Limited ju-
risdiction over such claims ensures that only expropriation claims,
meeting the strict requirements of § 1605(a)(3), deny a country
immunity.
At least one court has shown its frustration with the absurdity
created by the FSIA in combination with Amerada Hess. The Dis-
trict of Columbia District Court held, in Princz v. Federal Repub-
lic of Germany,2 27 that Germany was not immune from suit for
violations of an American citizen's human rights during World
War I.228 Nazi Germany interned the plaintiff while he was a U.S.
citizen in two concentration camps during World War 11225 What
is key to this decision is that the court went outside the FSIA to
find jurisdiction. Judge Sporkin explained:
224. Id.
225. Id. at 435-36.
226. See Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 813 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1992) (argu-
ing that neither Congress nor Amerada Hess contemplated peremptory norms in their codi-
fication or interpretation of the FSIA, and that Congress could not have wanted a govern-
ment to hide behind the cloak of immunity after a total disregard for the rights of a U.S.
citizen).
227. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 813 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1992). But see
Denegri v. Republic of Chile, No. 86-3085, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4233 (D.D.C. 1992) (re-
jecting the argument that a country waives immunity by violating a peremptory norm, be-
cause of the strict interpretation given the FSIA by Amerada Hess).
228. 813 F. Supp. at 26.
229. Id. at 23.
1993]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
[t]he Supreme Court did not have such extraordinary facts as
those presently before this Court in rendering its decision in
Hess. And the court cannot believe that, in enacting the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, Congress contemplated a factual sce-
nario akin to that at bar. . . .Therefore, this Court concludes
neither Hess nor the FSIA bars this Court from hearing the
plaintiff's claim.2 °0
He continued, "[tihis Court finds that the Federal [sic] Sovereign
Immunity Act has no role to play where the claims alleged involve
undisputed acts of barbarism committed by a one-time outlaw na-
tion which demonstrated callous disrespect for the humanity of an
American citizen, simply because he was Jewish." 31
D. A Framework for Analyzing Jus Cogens Violations as a
Basis for Stripping FSIA Immunity
Overruling Amerada Hess or ignoring the FSIA is unnecessary
to find a jurisdictional basis for adjudicating claims against foreign
sovereigns who violate jus cogens. A better approach is rooted in
the position that nations that violate peremptory norms of interna-
tional law impliedly waive immunity23 2 by acting in ways that are
fundamentally inconsistent with sovereignty. Under this theory,
courts may deny immunity to states that torture and remain con-
sistent with the FSIA, as interpreted by the Supreme Court.
The FSIA's legislative history provides three examples of an
implied waiver.2 3 3 Implied waivers result when a foreign state ei-
ther (1) agrees to arbitration; (2) agrees that a particular country's
law should govern a contract; (3) or files a responsive pleading
without raising an immunity defense. s4 The implied waiver of im-
munity exception is narrow.2 5 The narrowness of implied waiver
and that of jus cogens, by definition, are complementary. Only a
small number of international law norms fit the description of pe-
230. Id. at 26.
231. Id.
232. See Belsky, supra note 24, for a comment arguing that states implicitly waive im-
munity by violating jus cogens norms.
233. The FSIA does not itself give examples of what constitutes a waiver. 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1605(a)(1) (West Supp. 1993).
234. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 19, at 18.
235. Werthan, supra note 46, at 126. See generally Seetransport Wiking Trader Schif-
farhtsgesellschaft MBH & Co., et al. v. Navimpex Centrala Navala & Uzinexportimport, 989
F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1993) (state owned shipbuilding contractor implicitly waived immunity
under § 1605(a)(1) of the FSIA).
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remptory norms. Therefore, including violations of peremptory
norms as a basis for an implied waiver would do little to expand
the scope of the waiver exception.
Precluding suits rooted in states' sovereign acts is the purpose
of the FSIA. Logically, a state loses its immunity for non-sovereign
actions, such as engaging in a commercial activity.236 In essence,
because the FSIA predicates immunity on sovereign acts, and then
provides exceptions, a country implicitly waives such immunity
precisely by acting in ways fundamentally inconsistent with sover-
eignty.237 Torture is inconsistent with sovereignty not merely be-
cause it is abhorrent, but because it violates long-recognized, inter-
national law principles, as reflected by its status as a peremptory
norm. It is the violation of jus cogens, resulting from a sovereign's
acts of torture, which makes these acts fundamentally inconsistent
with sovereignty. An implicit waiver of immunity under those con-
ditions is exceedingly appropriate.
The second example of an implied waiver provided in the
FSIA's legislative history provides an additional analytical frame-
work for waiving immunity for jus cogens violations. Under this
second example, a foreign state waives immunity when it agrees
that a particular country's law governs a transaction2 3 A peremp-
tory norm does not require such an express agreement; it is auto-
matically binding on all nations." 9 A nation "is bound both to ob-
serve and construe the accepted norms of international law,
formerly known as the law of nations."24 0 The requirement of in-
ternational consensus before a norm becomes jus cogens is impor-
tant because it manifests the mutual assent of nations to be bound
by a particular legal principle. Just as two parties can agree to be
bound by a particular law, countries, as members of the interna-
tional community, implicitly agree to be bound to peremptory
norms. It, therefore, justifies waiving immunity for its violators.
United States courts agree with the position that a country
that violates a peremptory norm like torture engages in behavior
that is fundamentally inconsistent with sovereignty. United States
236. 28 U.S.C § 1605(a)(2) (West Supp. 1993).
237. The structure of the FSIA creates a presumption of immunity. It lists exceptions
to this presumption. When a government acts in a non-sovereign capacity, engaging in com-
mercial transactions or committing torts in the United States, then the cloak of immunity
drops. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)( 2 ),(5) (West Supp. 1993).
238. H.R. RaE. No. 1487, supra note 19, at 18.
239. BROWNLE, supra note 42, at 513; see supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
240. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 877 (2d Cir. 1980).
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Courts, for example, have expressly refused to regard assassina-
tions as acts for which foreign states are immune.
In Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 41 as a result of Chile's partic-
ipation in the assassination of her former ambassador to the
United States, the court denied Chile immunity.2 42 The court re-
fused to view an assassination plot as a discretionary act provided
with immunity under § 1605(a)(5)(A). s45 A country "has no 'dis-
cretion' to perpetrate conduct designed to result in the assassina-
tion of an individual or individuals, action clearly contrary to the
precepts of humanity as recognized in both national and interna-
tional law."2
4 4
In Liu v. Republic of China,s45 the court said "planning and
conducting the murder of Henry Liu could not have been a discre-
tionary function as defined by the FSIA."' 46 Plotting an assassina-
tion could involve policy judgments, and could, therefore, be the
public act of a state. Nevertheless, because it violated international
human rights law,24 7 the court held that there was no "room for
policy judgement and decision. 2 48
It is because of the violation of human rights law that courts
refuse to view these acts as consistent with fundamental principles
of sovereignty. Violating states are not immune under § 1605(a)(5)
when such human rights violations are committed in the United
States.24 9 Yet, whether those acts occur in the United States or on
foreign land, their nature is the same. They are not consistent with
fundamental principles of sovereignty. While the Sidermans were
not alleging jurisdiction under § 1605(a)(5) because Jos6
Siderman's torture occurred in Argentina, the reasoning of Letelier
and Liu are relevant. The same basis for which courts cannot re-
241. 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980).
242. Id. at 673.
243. Id. § 1605(a)(5)(A) provides a foreign State immunity for torts occuring in the
U.S. if they result from a discretionary function of the foreign State, whether or not the
discretion is abused.
244. Id. at 673.
245. 642 F. Supp. 297 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
246. Id. at 305 (referring to § 1605(a)(5)(A)).
247. RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, § 702(c) (stating that murder violates customary in-
ternational law unless it follows due process or an exigent circumstance, such as in a police
officer's line of duty).
248. 642. F. Supp. at 305 (basing its reasoning in part on Letelier v. Republic of Chile,
488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980)).
249. See Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980); Liu v. Republic
of China, 642 F. Supp. 297 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
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gard assassinations as discretionary acts should apply to torture as
being inconsistent with sovereignty.
Foreign states lend credence to the characterization of torture
as fundamentally inconsistent with notions of sovereignty. In the
State Department's experience, no government has ever asserted a
right to torture its own nationals.250 Rather than asserting a right
to torture, a country accused of such a crime usually denies it.2 51
One commentator has observed that:
[t]he best evidence for the existence of international law is that
every State recognizes that it does exist and that it is itself
under an obligation to observe it. States often violate interna-
tional law, just as individuals often violate municipal law; but no
more than individuals do States defend their violations by
claiming that they are above the law. '
Therefore, by not claiming a sovereign right to torture, nations im-
plicitly admit that it is not within their sovereign power to torture.
Furthermore, holding under the FSIA that nations violating
peremptory norms are not immune from suit in U.S. courts is con-
sistent with legislative intent. "[T]he central premise of the bill:
[is] [t]hat decisions on claims by foreign states to sovereign immu-
nity are best made by the judiciary on the basis of a statutory re-
gime which incorporates standards recognized under interna-
tional law." 58 In another section Congress has stated that
"[s]overeign immunity is a doctrine of international law."2 ' In
short, it is the intent of Congress that courts interpret the FSIA
consistently with standards of international law. Therefore, courts
that strip the immunity of nations that violate the highest stan-
dard of international law-peremptory .norms-further Congress'
interpretational objective. On the other hand, courts which do not
deny that immunity frustrate congressional objectives.
This interpretation of the FSIA is advantageous and logical
because it preserves the necessary flexibility for adoption of evolv-
ing international law standards by effectively incorporating newly
250. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting Memorandum of
the United States as amicus curiae at 16 n.34).
251. Id. Less frequently, they assert that the torture was unauthorized or that the
"rough treatment" fell short of torture. Id.
252. Id. at 884 n.15 (quoting J. BRmiRLY, THE OUTLOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-5
(1944)).
253. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 19, at 14 (emphasis added).
254. Id. at 8.
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recognized international law principles. The implied waiver excep-
tion provides the best method for accomplishing this. Professor
Riesenfeld 255 would support this argument:
the question arises whether inclusive codifications hamper the
development of rules which permit redress in domestic courts
for serious international wrongs. While the United States stat-
ute, alone among all others, provides, within narrowly defined
boundaries, exceptions from immunity from suit in cases of ex-
propriation in violation of international law, it does not ex-
pressly restrict immunity in cases where redress is sought for
personal injury suffered outside the forum state by actions con-
stituting recognized violations of human rights, such as torture
with the complicity of a foreign state. It would seem that in such
cases customary international law bars entitlement to immunity
and that state laws should not thwart the administration of in-
ternational justice in such cases, at least so long as the offending
state does not offer a more convenient forum. To consider codifi-
cations comprehensive and exclusive is unsound and not to be
implied, unless there is a clear legislative mandate to that
effect.""6
Violations of jus cogens norms disrupt international order.2 67
They impact all states and all persons. Today's international com-
munity is comprised of a diverse spectrum of social, economic, and
political organization."" The allegiance of nations, as a conse-
quence, depends on the allegiance of all its members to norms
which, at the very least, protect and promote coexistence in an or-
ganized society. This requires a concept of sovereignty that embod-
ies both rights and duties. Peremptory norms provide some of the
essential components of the modern law definition of sovereignty
to incorporate this concept.
Recognizing violations of peremptory norms as an interna-
tional problem, 59 one court has said that "for purposes of civil lia-
bility, the torturer has become-like the pirate and slave trader
255. Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley.
256. Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Sovereign Immunity in Perspective, 19 VAND. J. TRANSN'L L.
1, 16-17 (1986).
257. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 208, at 29.
258. Belsky, supra note 24, at 391. Such heterogeneity is distinctly different from the
homogeneity of the western nations that founded classical international law. Id.
259. The U.N. characterizes gross violations of human rights, such as widespread acts
of torture, as a matter of international concern because they cause "international friction."
BUERGENTHAL, supra note 208, at 29.
[Vol. 24:3
SIDERMAN DE BLAKE
before him-hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.""26
When both parties are foreign, as in the Sidermans' case, a U.S.
court adjudicating a torture claim might offend foreign govern-
ments. However, the very fact that such suits involve violations of
peremptory norms-violations of legitimate concern to the interna-
tional community and all governments-defeats this objection.
Governments necessarily accept outside scrutiny of their compli-
ance with peremptory norms.2" Yet, notwithstanding this outside
scrutiny, governments do not always have the political will to con-
demn violators. Condemnation is less likely if, for example, the
United States has an interest in maintaining good relations with
the violating country.2 62 Therefore, giving the aggrieved individual
a remedy in court increases the likelihood that violators do not go
unpunished. Judicial remedies also serve the interests of the inter-
national community of nations. Judicial, rather than political,
sanctions save governments from the uncomfortable position of
having to directly condemn violating nations."'3 Torture is so
strictly proscribed by the international community that reasons for
protecting violating states with the cloak of immunity are weak to
nonexistent. Neither "grace" nor "comity" need be extended to
countries that blatantly violate peremptory norms.
As a result of Siderman de Blake, an individual cannot sue a
foreign state in U.S. courts for violations of peremptory norms. Al-
though the principle of jus cogens is forceful, since it is highly un-
likely that violating states would be receptive to such claims, an-
other forum must exist to apply it, if it is to have any practical
effect. Furthermore, international condemnation does not always
work as an effective deterrent to countries. Therefore, these norms
require private individuals to ensure compliance and a legal system
that adjudicates suits of this nature.
VI. CONCLUSION
The impact of Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina is
that today aggrieved plaintiffs will find it easier to sue for the ex-
propriation of their property in their country of origin than for
260. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (emphasis in original).
261. Belsky, supra note 24, at 413. See generally Parker & Neylon, supra note 64, at
391.
262. See also generally HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE, supra note 69, at 13-14.
263. This assumes that violating nations understand the U.S. constitutional principle of
separation of powers.
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their brutal torture. By allowing plaintiffs to allege claims rooted
in post-expropriation commercial activities, the court has unwit-
tingly allowed a foreigner to sue for claims based on the expropria-
tion of his property abroad, under the commercial activity excep-
tion. This, in turn, confuses both the commercial activity and
expropriation exceptions. At the same time, Siderman de Blake
stands for the proposition that foreigners shall not use U.S. courts
to sue governments responsible for their torture. Thus, the Ninth
Circuit has implicitly communicated that torturing states need not
fear American judicial actions-but thieves must.
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